Welcome to CASCADE

Since Kocher's pioneering works in timing analysis (1996) and power analysis (1999) side-channel analysis has become an important field of research at universities and in the industry. Side-channel attacks do not attack cryptographic algorithms directly (as classical cryptanalysis does) but exploit weaknesses of the implementation, hardware properties or features of the operating system. It is easy to predict that side-channel analysis will remain a very active field of research over the next years.

The research group CASCADE is interested in all classes of side-channel analysis (power attacks, timing attacks, cache attacks etc.) and countermeasures. This comprises the development of new analysis techniques and new attacks as well as the improvement of known attacks. Moreover, we concentrate on the design of secure systems and on new design methodologies. Our main focus lies on constructive side-channel analysis and on the interaction between attacks and security design.

Please read more on our research site.